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MINDING THE GAP: SEEKING AUTISM COVERAGE IN 
CLASS ACTIONS WHEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS FAIL 
 
DANIELLE M. JAFFEE* 
 
*** 
 
This Note examines the recent trend towards class actions to challenge 
insurers’ denial of autism treatment coverage.  The author examines how 
state and federal laws regarding insurance coverage of autism treatment 
creates a gap allowing insurers to deny coverage, even in spite of the 
overwhelming proof of the beneficial nature of autism treatment for autistic 
individuals.  Past individual challenges of insurers’ actions gave 
little guidance to consumers about the legal obligations of insurers for 
autism treatment and recent collective action has done little to provide 
more.  The author examines the decisions of three courts determining the 
certification of class challenges to insurers' denials, and proffers how 
consumers can successfully challenge insurers' practices in class actions 
moving forward. 
*** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Currently one in sixty-eight children in the United States is 
diagnosed with Autism Spectrum Disorder, a number that continues to 
increase nearly seventeen percent each year.1 These growing numbers have 
put increasing pressure on insurance companies to determine what, if any, 
coverage they provide for individuals living with autism and even more 
pressure on governments to enact laws ensuring assistance for thousands of 
citizens.2 The pressures and actions of insurers, though plentiful, have left a 
                                                                                                                                
* University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2014; American 
University, B.A. 2008. I would like to thank Professor Alexandra Lahav for her 
guidance and insight as I developed this Note. I am also sincerely grateful to my 
family for their many years of love and support. 
1 Autism Has High Costs to U.S. Society, HARVARD SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH 
(Apr. 25, 2006), http://archive.sph.harvard.edu/press-releases/2006-releases/press 
04252006.html [hereinafter High Costs]; CDC Estimates 1 in 68 Children has 
Been Identified with Autism Spectrum Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (March 27, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014 /p0327-
autism-spectrum-disorder.html.  
2 See generally Insurance Coverage for Autism, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Aug. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/autism-
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clear gap of coverage for autism treatment in the self-insured market.  With 
no federal or state laws to fall back on, individuals are often forced to turn 
to the legal system for assistance.  While individual claims for autism 
treatment have been brought before the courts for over twenty years, a 
recent trend towards class actions has painted an unclear picture of the 
rights of the insured to challenge insurers and the ability of courts to allow 
class challenges in an area generally considered one of individual review 
by insurance companies.   
This Note examines the recent movement toward class action 
lawsuits against health insurance providers to ensure coverage for autism 
treatment.  Part II reviews what autism is, its growing prevalence in the 
United States, and its treatment.  Part III provides a brief overview of state 
and federal laws regarding insurance coverage of autism treatment and why 
it leaves the door open for courtroom battles.  Part IV examines past 
individual legal challenges for coverage that set the stage for current class 
actions.  Part V discusses several recent claims for coverage through class 
action lawsuits and the vastly different and contradictory rulings district 
courts issued regarding class certification.  Part VI compares the class 
actions and how the divergent court rulings fail to provide a legal bridge for 
the autism coverage gap created by federal and state laws.  Finally, part VII 
looks to establish an approach to determine class certification for future 
class action filings on autism coverage in light of the confusing precedent. 
 
II. AUTISM: WHAT IT IS, HOW TO TREAT IT, AND ITS 
GROWING PREVALENCE IN AMERICA 
 
Autism is a developmental disease that is being diagnosed at 
increasing rates in America.  It is generally held that early intervention and 
treatment of autism helps children better develop, however, disputes 
frequently arise between individuals, heath care providers, and insurers as a 
result of the nature of treatment championed for autistic children.  
 
                                                                                                                                
and-insurance-coverage-state-laws.aspx [hereinafter NCSL]; Essential Health 
Benefits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/essential-health-
benefits/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2014); Preventative Care, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/preventive-care/index.html (last visited Feb. 
19, 2014). 
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A.  AUTISM, THE DISEASE 
 
The National Institute of Child Health and Human Development 
defines autism as a complex developmental disability that results in 
problems with social interactions and communication.3 Autism manifests 
itself in individuals differently and thus there are varying diagnoses that 
require different levels and amounts of therapy.4 Combined, “classic” 
autism, Asperger syndrome, and atypical autism (often diagnosed as 
Pervasive Developmental Disorder) are part of the Autism Spectrum 
Disorder5 (ASD).6   
Autism usually emerges in a child before the age of three and is 
diagnosable under the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual (DSM-IV).7 
Although at one time it was believed that autism was a product of 
nurture rather than nature, recent research has shown a clear link between 
autism and genetics.  Several studies which examined familial relationships 
and autism diagnoses show that in families where one child has been 
diagnosed with autism there is an increased likelihood that a second child 
in the family will also be diagnosed with autism.8 While studies continue to 
shed light on certain factors that increase the risk of autism, including birth 
                                                                                                                                
3 Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD): Condition Information, NAT’L INST. OF 
CHILD HEALTH & HUMAN DEV. (Dec. 18, 2012), http://www.nichd.nih.gov/ 
health/topics/autism/conditioninfo/Pages/default.aspx [hereinafter NICHD]. 
4 Id. 
5 For purposes of this Note, the use of the term autism will encapsulate all 
Autism Spectrum Disorders. 
6 NICHD, supra note 3. 
7 Facts, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/facts.html; 
Diagnostic Criteria, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/hcp-dsm.html; 
THE DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, §299.00 (Am. 
Psychiatric Ass’n 4th ed.) (1994).  
8 Two studies have shown that parents who have a child diagnosed with ASD 
have a 2-18% chance of having a second child diagnosed with ASD; while other 
studies have shown an increased diagnosis rate of 36-95% in identical twins when 
one child is diagnosed with ASD. Research, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (June 19, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
ncbddd/autism/research.html#howmany. 
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to older parents9 and children with certain genetic or chromosomal 
conditions,10 there is still much unknown about what causes autism.  
Currently, the CDC is conducting a multi-year study to identify additional 
factors linked to autism diagnoses.11 
 
B.  THE GROWING PREVALENCE OF AUTISM 
 
In the last forty years the diagnoses of autism in the United States 
have increased substantially.  In 1975 the prevalence of autism diagnoses 
per person was 1 in 5,000; in 1985 it increased to 1 in 2,500 and in 1995 it 
reached 1 in 500.12 Since 2001 the number has increased from 1 in 250 to 1 
in 68 in 2014.13 Autism is now more common than Down syndrome or 
childhood cancer.14 Autism diagnosis trends also show a bigger impact on 
males.  The current diagnosis rates reflect boys are five times more likely 
to be diagnosed with autism than girls.15 
Currently, over 1.5 million Americans are diagnosed with autism.  
While the number is alarming, more alarming is that the rate of individuals 
diagnosed with autism is growing 10-17% per year, meaning in five years 
the number of individuals in America diagnosed with autism could be 
larger than the population of New Hampshire.16 
 
                                                                                                                                
9 Maureen S. Durkin et al., Advanced Parental Age and the Risk of Autism 
Spectrum Disorder, 168 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 1268, 1268 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2638544/pdf/kwn250.pdf. 
10 Data and Statistics, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION  (Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/ 
autism/data.html [hereinafter Data and Statistics]. 
11 SEED, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION (Feb. 3, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/seed.html. 
12 AUTISM SPEAKS, SELF-FUNDED EMPLOYER TOOL KIT 22, available at 
http://www.autismspeaks.org/sites/default/files/docs/gr/erisa_tool_kit_9.12_0.pdf 
[hereinafter Employer Toolkit]. 
13 CDC Estimates 1 in 68 Children has Been Identified with Autism Spectrum 
Disorder, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (March 27, 2014), 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0327-autism-spectrum-disorder.html. 
14 Geoffrey Cowley, Understanding Autism, NEWSWEEK (July 30, 2000, 5:20 
PM), http://www.newsweek.com/understanding-autism-161485. 
15 Boys are diagnosed at a rate of 1 in 54 while girls are diagnosed at a rate of 
1 in 252. Data and Statistics, supra note 10. 
16 High Costs, supra note 1; New Hampshire QuickFacts from the US Census 
Bureau, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jan. 16, 2014), http://quickfacts.census.gov 
/qfd/states/33000.html. 
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C.  TREATING AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS 
 
 Much of the discussion pertaining to insurance coverage for autism 
centers on insurance companies covering the treatment expenses that a 
family incurs as a result of the diagnosis.  Because autism is a 
developmental disorder, the treatment of the disease focuses on not only 
medication, but additionally, social skills, communication, speech therapy, 
and sensory integration training.17 Such therapies are often deemed by 
insurance companies to be either educational or experimental,18 thus 
eliminating their burden to provide coverage because insurance policies 
exclude “experimental” and “educational” treatments as terms of their 
contract.19  
The key to treatment for autism comes from research establishing 
that early intervention can dramatically improve a child’s development and 
therefore children with autism are encouraged to begin receiving services 
between birth and three years of age.20 Thus, the bulk of expenses for 
autism treatment come between the first few years of life when children are 
undergoing intensive treatment programs to ensure steady development.   
The most notable form of treatment and the central issue at hand in 
the pending class actions against insurers is Applied Behavioral Analytics 
(ABA).  ABA is defined as “the science in which tactics derived from the 
principles of behavior are applied systematically to improve socially 
significant behavior and experimentation is used to identify the variables 
responsible for behavior change.”21 ABA therapy is a highly structured 
one-on-one coaching led by a certified instructor in which a child engages 
                                                                                                                                
17 Treatment, Autism Spectrum Disorders, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION,  (Dec. 20, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/treatment.html 
[hereinafter Treatment]. 
18 Insurance companies commonly provide themselves a loophole that allows 
them to deny a request for coverage of experimental treatments, favoring instead 
that all procedures covered are thoroughly tested and proven effective. See 
generally  Jim Williams, When Insurers Won’t Pay for Experimental Treatments, 
ABC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/WNT/story?id=131212 
&page=1. 
19 Angela Barner, Unlocking Access to Insurance Coverage for Autism 
Treatment, 6 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 107, 108 (2009). 
20 Treatment, supra note 17. 
21 Paul Mooney et. al., Behavior Modification/Traditional Techniques for 
Students with Emotional and Behavioral Disorders, in 22 BEHAVIORAL 
DISORDERS: IDENTIFICATION, ASSESSMENT, AND INSTRUCTION OF STUDENTS WITH 
EBD 173, 174 (Jeffrey P. Bakken et al. eds., 2012). 
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in positive reinforcement exercises targeting areas such as language, play, 
learning, and real-life functioning.22 Studies and advocates strongly 
encourage the use of ABA treatment in the early stages of life to ensure 
proper development for children with autism, often stating that if a child 
receives ABA therapy early there is a strong likelihood that the child will 
eventually be able to attend regular classes.23   
Behavior analysis treatment for children with autism started in the 
1960s when Ivar Lovaas and others at the University of California, Los 
Angeles, conducted a study amongst forty children diagnosed with autism 
and subjected them to various amounts of behavior analysis treatment.24  
The original study showed a substantial improvement in individuals that 
underwent forty hours of one-on-one ABA treatment, many of whom were 
successfully mainstreamed into a regular classroom.25 Further studies have 
also shown that ABA therapy results in long and short-term gains in 
intellectual function and educational progress.26 
 In 1999, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
issued a report of the Surgeon General on mental health showing 
substantial support for ABA therapy and its proven efficacy.27 Then again 
in 2001, the U.S. Surgeon General’s report on mental health further 
corroborated these findings, asserting that ABA therapy minimizes socially 
unacceptable behavior while increasing socially appropriate behavior, 
communication skills, and learning abilities for children with autism.28   
As a result of years of toting the advantages of ABA therapy, most 
autistic children participate in the intensive program.  Generally, the 
treatment is administered for thirty to forty hours a week for three to four 
years, costing families several thousands of dollars. 
 
                                                                                                                                
22 Iver Peterson, High Rewards and High Costs As States Draw Autistic 
Pupils,  N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/06/ 
nyregion/high-rewards-and-high-costs-as-states-draw-autisticpupils.html?page 
wanted=all&src=pm. 
23 Barner, supra note 19, at 110; Peterson, supra note 22. 
24 Beth Rosenwasser & Saul Axelrod, The Contributions of Applied Behavior 
Analysis to the Education of People with Autism, 25 BEHAV. MODIFICATION 671, 
672 (October 2001), available at http://bmo.sagepub.com/content/25/5/671.  
25 Id. at 672. 
26 Barner, supra note 19, at 111. 
27 U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF 
THE SURGEON GENERAL 163-64 (1999), available at http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ 
ps/access/NNBBHS.pdf. 
28 Barner, supra note 19, at 111. 
2014  MINDING THE GAP 605 
  
 
D.  THE COSTS OF TREATMENT: HEAVY BURDENS ON FAMILIES AND 
STATES BUT POCKET CHANGE FOR INSURERS 
 
  In 2006, Harvard released a report by Michael Ganz, MS, PhD that 
examined the growing costs of autism coverage on individuals, families, 
and society.29 The report found that it costs society $35 billion annually to 
care for individuals with autism and $3.2 million for an individual to cover 
their own care over a lifetime. 
Further, Ganz and other studies have found, individuals with 
autism incur twice as many expenses for care as the typical American in 
their lifetime.  Reports have shown that it can total up to $81,900 for a 
family to provide adequate treatment to a child with autism, including 
speech therapy, occupational therapy, and ABA treatment.30 A child with 
autism will incur 2.5 times more outpatient costs and 2.9 times more 
inpatient costs in their lifetime than an individual without autism.31 These 
costs only increase if an individual’s insurance company fails to cover even 
some of the treatment. 
Ganz’s report also examined the cost to society as a whole for 
autism.  These figures considered the effect of autism on both individuals 
with the disease and their family/caregivers.  Considerations included the 
lower level of employment procured by autistic individuals, including 
decreased pay and benefits, as well as lower savings value due to increased 
expenses for medical treatment, therapies, and special programing 
requirements.32 The study also accounted for the loss or impairment of 
work time for family members of autistic individuals, including missed 
work, reduced hours, lower-paying jobs with more flexible requirements, 
or leaving the workforce entirely to care for their autistic family member.33  
While the numbers for individuals and families coping with autism 
are often staggering and equivalent to an individual’s annual income, the 
cost for insurers is far less.  The Council for Affordable Health Insurance 
(CAHI) released information in 2009 claiming that an autism mandate, 
                                                                                                                                
29 See generally Michael L. Ganz, The Lifetime Distribution of the Incremental 
Societal Costs of Autism, 161 ARCHIVES OF  PEDIATRIC  & ADOLESCENT  MED. 343 
(2007). 
30 Laura C. Hoffman, Ensuring Access to Health Care for the Autistic Child: 
More is Needed Than Federal Health Care Reform, 41 SW. U. L. REV. 435, 437 
(2012). 
31 Id. 
32 Ganz, supra note 29, at 348. 
33 Id. at 344.  
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legislation that requires health insurers to cover autism treatment, only 
increases the cost of health insurance by about 1%.34 CAHI cautions that 
the cost could increase if more services are mandated, but they still 
estimate only a one to three percent increase.35 
Further, in the absence of insurance coverage, many families that 
cannot carry the financial burden of treatment expenses move their children 
into the Medicaid system, which may cover autism treatment at a higher 
rate than private insurers.  Medicaid coverage is often superior to private 
insurance because state Medicaid programs offer some level of mental 
health services coverage and reimbursement,36 while private insurance may 
not.  With nearly 50% of Medicaid beneficiaries suffering from 
diagnosable mental health disorders in a given year,37 the pressure to keep 
citizens with access to private health insurance out of the state Medicaid 
programs is growing.  The more individuals with medical conditions that 
the Medicaid system absorbs, the greater financial burden placed on a state 
to finance the expanding costs of the program, an even heavier burden with 
many states struggling from significant state budget deficits. 
 
III.  WHAT THE LAWS SAY AND WHY IT IS A BATTLE FOR 
COVERAGE 
 
 Over the last few decades autism coverage proponents have 
experienced a number of victories in the quest to ensure coverage.  
However, even in light of moves by both the federal and state governments, 
efforts have fallen short of reaching millions of Americans, most notably 
those covered by employer-sponsored health plans.38  
 
                                                                                                                                
34 Victoria C. Bunce, The Growing Trend Toward Mandating Autism 
Coverage, 152 COUNCIL FOR AFFORDABLE HEALTH INS. ISSUES & ANSWERS (Mar. 
2009), available at www.cahi.org/cahi_contents/resources/pdf/n152AutismTrend. 
pdf. 
35 Id. 
36 Mental Health Services, MEDICAID.GOV,http://www.medicaid.gov/ Medic 
aid-CHIP-Program-Information/ByTopics/Benefits/Mental-Health-Services-.html 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
37 BEHAVIORAL HEALTH IS ESSENTIAL TO HEALTH: PREVENTION WORKS, 
TREATMENT IS EFFECTIVE, PEOPLE RECOVER, SUBSTANCE ABUSE & MENTAL 
HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN. 1, 7, available at http://www.hhs.gov/ partnerships/ 
aca_act_and_community/aca_behavioralhealth.pdf. 
38 Employer Toolkit, supra note 12, at 33. 
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A.  FEDERAL  
 
The work on the federal level to guarantee autism coverage has 
been spotty at best.  The federal government has made broad strokes in an 
attempt to make mental illness and behavioral treatment a staple of health 
plan coverage.  However, while these efforts are admirable, each one falls 
short of truly providing coverage for such ailments. 
At the forefront of autism coverage is the Mental Health Parity 
Act, originally passed by Congress in 1996 and amended to fix certain 
loopholes in 2008.39 Together the laws require group health plans to 
establish financial requirements and treatment limits for mental health and 
substance abuse services that are no less restrictive than the requirements 
and limitations imposed on medical and surgical benefits.40 Mental Health 
Parity impacts autism coverage in that the DSM, which serves as the basis 
for the definition of mental health ailments for both laws and insurers, 
clearly classifies autism as a mental health disorder.  The problem with the 
act as it is structured is that it does not require mental health benefits 
coverage; it simply states that if, and only if, a health plan already covers 
mental health, such benefits shall be no less restrictive.  This in turn leaves 
the option open for health insurers to simply not offer mental health 
coverage to avoid being subject to such regulations.  
Another federal attempt at providing mental health coverage, and 
specifically autism coverage, to citizens can be found in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).  First, section 1302(b) of the 
ACA requires all individual and small group plans to provide coverage for 
“essential benefits.”41 Originally the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services was slated to establish a list of required essential benefits that each 
state must use as their minimum requirements, giving autism advocates 
hope that treatment would be covered under the mental health and 
behavioral health treatment category of “essential benefits.”42 However, in 
December 2011, the administration announced the intention that each state 
would be free to create their own list of “essential benefits” to serve as the 
                                                                                                                                
39 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-26 (2006). 
40 Id. 
41 CENTER FOR CONSUMER AND INSURANCE OVERSIGHT, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE 
& MEDICAID SERVS., ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS BULLETIN 1-2 (2011), 
available at https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Files/Downloads/ essential 
_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf. 
42 See generally AUTISM SPEAKS, COVERAGE OF AUTISM SERVICES UNDER THE 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT’S ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS PACKAGE (Oct. 11, 2011). 
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benchmark for all small and individual plans sold within the state.43 
Resulting from the state flexibility approach, only eleven states deemed 
autism treatment coverage an essential benefit in their benchmark plans.44  
 Second, section 1001(5) of the ACA requires small group and 
individual health plans to provide preventative care services at no cost to 
the insured.45 As established by the Department of Health and Human 
Services, based in part on the recommendation and scoring of the U.S. 
Preventative Services Task Force, autism screenings for children aged 
eighteen to twenty-four months are considered a mandatory preventative 
service.46   
While the efforts of ACA will undoubtedly help provide coverage 
to many individuals, it still falls short of reaching the growing number of 
plans that are just outside of the federal regulations.  Large group plans are 
specifically exempt in the language of the ACA.47 Any employer-sponsored 
plan or individual health plan that was established prior to the passing of 
the ACA is deemed grandfathered, and thus protected from such 
requirements so long as they maintain grandfather status, which, for many, 
will be several years.48 Self-funded benefit plans are regulated by the 
                                                                                                                                
43 Christine Vestal & Matt McKillop, Health Law Explained: The States Gain 
New Flexibility in Setting Policies, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.pewstates.org/projects/stateline/headlines/health-law-explained-the-
states-gain-new-flexibility-in-setting-policies-85899375384. 
44 Christine Vestal, Q&A: How ACA Will Affect People With Autism, THE PEW 
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.pewstates.org/projects/ 
stateline/headlines/qa-how-aca-will-affect-people-with-autism-85899496217. 
45 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13 (2012) (codifying § 1001(5) of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010)). 
46 What Are My Preventative Care Benefits?, HEALTHCARE.GOV, 
https://www.healthcare.gov/what-are-my-preventive-care-benefits/#part=3 (last 
visited Dec. 17, 2013). 
47 Sarah Barr, FAQ: Grandfathered Health Plans, KAISER HEALTH NEWS 
(Nov. 13, 2013), http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/stories/2012/december/ 
17/ grandfathered-plans-faq.aspx. 
48 The law is structured to remove grandfathered status once a plan makes 
“significant” changes that result in increased costs or decreased benefits to 
participants. This caveat ensures that inevitably most, if not all, plans will comply 
with the ACA requirements. Current studies state that the number of individuals 
covered by grandfathered plans has begun to steadily decline and will continue 
downward in the coming years. Current numbers show that 48% of those covered 
by their employers are enrolled in grandfathered plans in 2012, down from 54% in 
2011.  Id. 
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Employee Retirement Income Security Act and exempt from all 
requirements described above under federal law.   
 
B.  STATE 
 
In the absence of comprehensive requirements on the federal level 
for autism coverage, many states have taken it upon themselves to 
implement legislation requiring insurers to cover autism.  Indiana passed 
the first meaningful piece of autism coverage legislation in 2001.  The law 
requires individual and group insurance plans to provide coverage for the 
treatment of pervasive developmental disorders, including autism, that have 
been prescribed by an individual’s treating physician.49 
It was not until several years later that the movement to require 
autism coverage took hold and laws began appearing in several states.  
Currently thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia have laws that 
address autism coverage, with the bulk of states adopting such legislation 
in the last four to five years.50 
 The content of autism coverage laws varies from state to state, with 
thirty-one states specifically requiring insurers to provide for the treatment 
                                                                                                                                
49 IND. CODE §§ 27-8-14.2-3, 27-8-14.2-4, 27-8-14.2-5 (2013). 
50 Nine states adopted laws in the 2007-2008 legislative session, eight states in 
the 2009 legislative session, nine states in the 2010 legislative session, six states in 
2011, and three states in 2012. NCSL, supra note 2; ALA. CODE § 27-54A-2 
(2013); ALASKA STAT. § 21.42.397 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-826.04, 
20-1057.11, 20-1402.03, 20-1404.03 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-418 (2013); 
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1374.72, 1374.73 (2013); COLO. REV. STAT. § 
10-16-104 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3366 (2013); FLA. STAT. §§ 627.6686, 
641.31098 (2013); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT.5/356Z.14 (2013); IND. CODE §§ 27-8-
14.2, 27-13-7-14 (2013); IOWA CODE § 514C.28 (2013); KAN. STATE. ANN. § 76-
6524 (2013); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 304.17A-142, 143 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
22:1050 (2013); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A § 2768 (2013); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. IV §§ 32A-22, 25 (2013); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 550.1416e (2013); 
MO. REV. STAT. § 376.1224 (2013); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 33-22-515, 33-22-706 
(2013); NEV. REV. STAT. § 689A.0435, 689B.0335 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
417-E:1-2 (2013); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 17:48-6ii, 17:48-A-7ff, 17B:26-2.1cc, 
17B:27-46.lii, 17B:27A-7.16, 17B:27A-19.20 (2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-
22-49, 59A-23-7.9, 59A-46-50, 59A-47-45 (2013); N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3216, 3221 
(2013); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27.20.11 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-71-280 (2013); 
TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1355.015 (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8 § 4088i (2013); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 38.2-3412.1:01 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 5-16B-6e (2013); WIS. STAT. 
§ 632.895(12m) (2013). 
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of autism.51 Overall, the laws implemented throughout the country establish 
varying annual cap limits on how much an insurer is required to pay out, 
from no limit to $50,000 a year, and also varying age limits that an insurer 
is required to cover, such as coverage for life or just for the first two to six 
years of life.52  
 While states have made great strides to ensure autism coverage for 
their citizens, it should be noted that because of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) pre-emption discussed next, self-insured 
plans53 are exempt from these state level requirements.  This means that 
29% of children aged 0-18 that are covered by self-insured plans might not 
have autism coverage.54 While several self-insured plans, such as those 
offered by Microsoft, Eli Lilly, and Home Depot, voluntarily provide 
autism benefits,55 such actions are not mandated by law and therefore there 
is no guarantee as health care expenses rise that these companies will 
continue to provide these benefits. 
 
C.  ERISA 
 
One of the biggest roadblock to coverage for autism can be found 
in ERISA.  While efforts have been made on the federal level to establish 
requirements of coverage and equal treatment, and even on the state level 
to specifically require autism coverage, many plans can still be exempt 
from such mandates56 leaving millions57 without a safety net. 
ERISA applies to health benefit plans offered in the private 
industry, but its most notable impact on health insurance laws comes in its 
protection of self-insured plans – or plans where the employer has taken on 
                                                                                                                                
51 NCSL, supra note 2. 
52 Employer ToolKit, supra note 12, at 25. 
53 The term self-insured plan refers to health benefit plans in which the plan 
sponsor, an employer, directly funds the health benefits for its enrollees. In 
contrast, fully-insured plans refer to situations in which an employer purchases 
group health insurance from an insurer. Michael J. Brien & Constantijin W.A. 
Panis, Self-Insured Health Benefit Plans, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 4 (Mar. 23, 2011), 
http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/ACASelfFundedHealthPlansReport032811.pdf. 
54 Employer Toolkit, supra note 12, at 33. 
55 Id. at 35. 
56 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2006). 
57 Employer Health Benefits: 2013 Summary of Findings, KAISER FAMILY 
FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, 1 (Aug. 20, 2013), available at  
http://kff.org/private-insurance/report/2013-employer-health-benefits/.  
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the financial risk of funding, managing, and administering, its health plan.58 
Under section 514 of ERISA, self-insured health benefit plans are insulated 
from many state insurance laws, specifically state insurance mandates.  
While the first clause, section 514(a), establishes the broad preemption 
power of ERISA,59 specifically, the Supreme Court has held that the key 
term of section 514(a), “relate to,” should be given its “broad common-
sense meaning,” so as to displace all state laws that are in connection with, 
or making reference, to an employee benefit plan,60 section 514(b)(2)(A), 
the “savings clause,” reserves the right of states to regulate insurance 
generally.61 Under this provision even if a state law is preempted under 
section 514(a) it can still be allowed so long as it regulates insurance, or in 
other words, if the state law is “specifically directed toward entities 
engaged in insurance . . . [and] . . . substantially affect[s] the risk pooling 
arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”62 
However, the Deemer clause, section 514(b)(2)(B), establishes the 
one exception to the right of states to regulate insurance and is the pinpoint 
clause that exempts self-insured from state mandates.63 The Deemer clause 
restricts states’ regulation of insurance to only insurance companies and 
contracts, not plans themselves.  Therefore, a self-insured plan is neither an 
insurance company nor a contract, thus exempt from state regulations and 
mandates.  This loophole created by the ERISA is what allows many plans 
to be free from autism treatment requirements, thus creating a gap of 
coverage for millions of Americans. 
 
                                                                                                                                
58 Matt Leming, More Employers Weigh Self-Funded Health Plans, SOC’Y 
FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT. (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.shrm.org/ 
hrdisciplines/benefits/Articles/Pages/SelfFunded.aspx..aspx. 
59 ERISA shall “supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or 
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.” 29 U.S.C. §1144(a). 
60 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Mass., 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air 
Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97-98 (1983). 
61 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).  
62 Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 342 (2003). 
63 This Deemer clause states that no employee benefit plan “shall be deemed 
to be an insurance company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of 
insurance . . . for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance 
companies [or] contracts.”  29 U.S.C. §1144(b)(2)(B). 
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IV.  THE PAST: PRIOR LEGAL BATTLES FOR AUTISM 
COVERAGE 
 
 The inability of federal and state laws to ensure coverage and the 
escalating cost of autism treatment has left many struggling for a way to 
hold insurers liable for treatment.  Some individuals have turned to the 
judicial system as a means to require insurers to provide coverage for 
treatment.  In these individual claims, courts have relied on the insurers 
inadequacies to establish individuals’ rights to autism treatment coverage, 
stating that insurers’ unsubstantiated rejections of treatment are not enough 
to uphold a denial of benefits.  However, while several individual cases 
exist, none of the courts have established a precedent that would extend 
beyond the individuals before them.  Each ruling was narrowly tailored to 
the case at hand, failing to establish a rule or guideline of when, and if, a 
court would require an insurer to provide specific coverage. 
The fight for health insurance coverage of autism is no stranger to 
the court system.  Dating back to the early 1990s, several individual claims 
against health insurers have been brought seeking coverage for autism 
treatment.  Collectively these individual claims show a deference of the 
courts to the needs and requirements of individuals over those of health 
insurers. 
The early predecessor to such claims came in 1990 when Kunin v. 
Benefit Trust Life Insurance was heard before the Ninth Circuit.64 Kunin 
was covered by an employer health plan, operated by Benefit Trust that 
refused to cover his numerous claims.  In 1986, Kunin’s son was diagnosed 
with autism and underwent thirty days of treatment, which cost over 
$54,000.65 The disagreement arose when Benefit Trust stated the policy 
only allowed for up to $10,000 for “mental illness or nervous disorders” 
reimbursement.66 The insurer held that autism was classified as a mental 
illness and therefore Kunin was responsible for costs beyond the 
reimbursement maximum.67 
In the opinion, the Court held that the classification of autism as a 
mental illness was an arbitrary and capricious decision by the insurer 
because they failed to substantiate the determination.  Specifically, the 
Court stated that the so-called expert the insurers relied on for such a 
classification had failed to disclose material information, including what 
                                                                                                                                
64 Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1990). 
65 Id. at 535. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
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other doctors he had consulted or his experience or particular expertise 
concerning autism, to establish a well-founded reasoning behind the 
determination.68 Further, the Court noted that the insurer had failed to make 
any effort to talk with the boy’s own physicians to determine the basis for 
diagnosis and the recommended treatment before establishing the 
classification.69 In light of these facts and because the policy in question 
was vaguely worded as to not contain a definition or explanation of mental 
illness, the Ninth Circuit found that the insurer was obligated to pay the full 
amount of the claim.70 While the case brought the issue of coverage for 
autism treatment to the forefront, the fact that it turned on the definition of 
mental illness in the policy language only established a case-specific 
holding for an insurer’s liability. 
 Following the Ninth Circuit’s decision, the district court for the 
Northern District of Illinois again displayed the proclivity of courts to favor 
the insured over the insurers in the face of inadequate rationale.  In Wheeler 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., the Plaintiff argued that Aetna wrongfully denied 
coverage of medical treatment for his son who suffered from numerous 
conditions, including autism.71 The majority of the argument centered on 
coverage for speech therapy, physical therapy, ABA therapy, and sensory 
integration therapy, most of which Aetna refused to cover, citing various 
reasons, specifically the lack of evidence that such therapies are effective.72 
Aetna argued that it had the right to reject coverage of certain therapies 
because the language of the policy granted them discretion to determine “to 
what extent employees and beneficiaries are entitled to benefits,” however 
the Court rejected this argument, stating that the discretionary decisions of 
Aetna must still be reasonable and must provide the insured with “every 
reason for [their] denial of benefits at the time of denial.”73   
 The Court then went on to examine three letters issued by Aetna in 
which “they utterly fail to consider the actual language of the plan at 
issue,” and thus had failed to provide adequate reasoning for their 
rejections.74 The Court found that the actions of Aetna were, in effect, 
classifying autism as a developmental disorder which was covered by the 
                                                                                                                                
68 Id. at 537-38. 
69 Id. at 538. 
70 Id. at 541.  
71 Wheeler v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 01 C 6064, 2003 WL 21789029, at *1 
(N.D. Ill. July 23, 2003). 
72 Id. at *3–4. 
73 Id. at *4–7. 
74 Id. at *9. 
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policy but then subsequently denying all treatment for developmental 
delays caused by autism.75 The Court held these actions by the insurer, if 
allowed, “[w]ould in effect render the provisions for coverage for autism 
meaningless.”76  
Although not a traditional individual claim, the Sixth Circuit issued 
another judicial opinion showing deference to protecting the rights of 
individuals to receive coverage of autism treatment in Parents’ League for 
Effective Autism Services v. Jones-Kelly.77 The guardians of three 
Medicaid-eligible children filed for a preliminary injunction against Ohio 
to prevent the state from implementing amendments that would effectively 
stop funding autism treatment.78 After the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS) issued proposed rules that would limit Medicaid 
coverage for rehabilitative services, Ohio promulgated amendments to its 
own Administrative Code, one of which limited coverage by defining 
rehabilitative services as those that would restore an individual to their 
prior functioning level.79 The new amendments effectively eradicated state 
funding to programs that provided autism treatment to Medicaid children.  
The lawsuit claimed such actions violate federal Medicaid law that 
provides eligible children with such services.80 Plaintiffs in the case argued 
that these rules deny funding to facilities responsible for providing autism 
treatment to Medicaid-eligible children.81 The Court did not rule on the 
merits, but instead granted a temporary restraining order to prevent the 
state from implementing the amendments.82 The decisions, although not 
conclusive, signaled the judicial system’s hesitance to allow actions that 
would eliminate adequate coverage for autism treatment in state-run 
Medicaid programs.  
It was not until several years after these cases that a district court 
would consider the question that currently plagues the class actions for 
autism treatment: does an insurer’s designation of ABA therapy as 
“experimental” warrant their refusal to cover such treatment under the 
terms of their plans?  In McHenry v. PacificSource Health Plans, the Court 
                                                                                                                                
75 Id. at *13. 
76 Id. at *13. 
77 Parents’ League for Effective Autism Servs. v. Jones-Kelley, 339 Fed. 
App’x. 542, 542 (6th Cir. 2009). 
78 Id. at 543. 
79 Id. at 545. 
80 Id. at 545-46. 
81 Id. at 551-52. 
82 Id. at 543-44, 552. 
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considered whether an insurance carrier was responsible to an ABA 
therapist after a child had been diagnosed with autism and his pediatrician 
prescribed ABA therapy.83 After seeing the therapist for four months, 
PacificSource denied payment citing its policy that allowed them to deny 
coverage for experimental or investigational procedures, as well as 
academic or social skills training.84 To support its rejection, PacificSource 
stated that there was “no ‘gold standard’ for the treatment of autism, and 
there is much debate in the literature regarding the efficacy of any one 
approach, including ABA . . . [thus] it [is] clear that ABA [is] not a well-
proven or evidence-based standard of medical care.”85 
 The Court rejected both arguments, holding that ABA is supported 
by decades of research and application, and stated that ABA is an 
acknowledged autism treatment by several government agencies, including 
the Department of Health and Human Services and the National Institute of 
Mental Health, and professional organizations, including the American 
Psychological Society.86 Further, the court stated that although ABA 
treatment may have incidental benefits related to education and social skills 
for autistic children, its main focus is modifying behaviors pertinent to 
every area of the child’s life and thus not solely an academic or social skills 
program.87 In the end, the Court found that ABA therapy was medically 
necessary for Wheeler’s autism treatment.88    
While the judicial prerogative has been to favor the insured and 
coverage for autism treatment, the Court’s failure to rule in a broader 
context leaves the critical question of all these claims unanswered: will, 
and should, insurers be required to provide coverage of autism treatment to 
their insured? 
 
                                                                                                                                
83 McHenry v. PacificSource Health Plans, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1226, 1228-29 (D. 
Or. 2010). 
84 Id. at 1228. 
85 Id. at 1236. 
86 Id. at 1237-38. 
87 Id. at 1240-41. 
88 Id. at 1248. In the end, the Court ruled against a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, stating that a secondary reason for denial of payments based on the 
ABA therapists lack of credentialing was enough to support a refusal of 
PacificSource to reimburse. Id. at 1245-46.  
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V.  THE PRESENT: BANDING TOGETHER TO CHALLENGE 
INSURERS FOR AUTISM COVERAGE 
 
After years of individual claims against insurers, a new breed of 
cases regarding autism coverage began to appear before the courts.  In 2010 
and 2011, insured individuals, who had been denied insurance coverage for 
ABA, began banding together to challenge their individual carriers.  Three 
separate claims for class certification were brought before federal courts to 
directly challenge their insurer’s denial of coverage for ABA therapy.89 The 
carriers stated the same reasoning for denial in all cases: ABA is an 
investigative and experimental treatment.  The charges of the insured were 
the same: the insurance carrier should provide coverage under my policy 
for ABA treatment for autism.90 However, the similarities ended there.  In 
the three cases, often with nearly identical facts, the reasoning of the judges 
resulted in very different outcomes for class certification.  
The first judge reasoned that the presented class failed to establish 
commonality, or failed to establish that there was a common question of 
law or fact applicable to the entire class.91 The court reasoned that a claim 
for autism treatment would require individualized review of an insured’s 
claim and medical treatment to determine if ABA therapy is actually 
experimental,92 thus a “determination of [the common question’s] truth or 
falsity” would not have resolved the central issue of all claims “in one 
stroke.”93 The second judge found no such failure to establish 
commonality, and determined that an insurance company’s across the 
board determinations regarding ABA therapy meant a common question of 
if ABA therapy was a covered benefit existed.94 Further, the judge stated 
that even though the entitlement award for the denied benefit might require 
individualized review under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), such 
determinations do not predominate over the common question plaguing all 
class members.95 Finally, the third judge found that such classes can easily 
be certified under common questions as the court is only seeking to 
                                                                                                                                
89 See generally Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 
2010 WL 670081 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010); Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL 9378789 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011); Churchill 
v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2011). 
90 Id. 
91 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2); Graddy, 2010 WL 670081, at *9. 
92 See Graddy, 2010 WL 670081 at *9. 
93 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). 
94 See Potter, 2011 WL 9378789, at *6. 
95 See id. 
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determine whether the denial of ABA claims are appropriate.96 However, 
limitations on relief apply in relation to who composes the class.97 These 
rulings create three distinct interpretations of the applicability of class 
adjudication of autism claims. 
 
A.  GRADDY, 2010 
 
First, in Graddy v. Blue Cross BlueShield of Tennessee Inc, a group 
of individuals covered by Blue Cross BlueShield of Tennessee (BCBST) 
moved for class certification in a claim against the insurer because of their 
denial of coverage for ABA therapy for autistic individuals.98 The Plaintiffs 
in the case claimed that the actions of BCBST violated ERISA, the 
Tennessee Autism Equity Act, and the Tennessee Consumer Protection 
Act.  Specifically, the claim stated that BCBST violated its fiduciary duties 
to the Plaintiffs when it failed to fairly and properly construe and interpret 
the language of the health plans for the exclusive purpose of providing 
benefits to the members of the plan.99 Further, they alleged that the 
Tennessee Autism Equity Act required BCBST to provide benefits and 
coverage for the treatment of autism at the same level it provided for other 
neurological disorders and that it had failed to do so when it rejected the 
claims.100 Finally, the Plaintiffs claimed BCBST had engaged in unfair and 
deceptive trade practices, violating the Tennessee Consumer Protection 
Act.101   
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) Rule 23(b)(2), 
the Plaintiffs moved to certify a class of all insured under the BCBST 
policy who have, or will make, a claim for coverage for ABA therapy and 
                                                                                                                                
96 See Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4 (E.D. 
Pa. Aug. 12, 2011). 
97 See id. at *4–6. In a subsequent amended complaint, Judge Sanchez allowed 
a second representative to be added to the class to capture all current Cigna 
members who had submitted ABA claims that were subsequently denied under 
Cigna’s current company-wide policy.  However, in the subsequent case Judge 
Sanchez denied the motion to certify a (b)(2) class because the class in its entirety 
sought individualized monetary damages, which were not certifiable under (b)(2).  
Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2012 WL 3590691, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 
21, 2012) [hereinafter Churchill II]. 
98 Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL 
670081, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).  
99 Id. at *1-4. 
100 Id at *6. 
101 Id. 
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BCBST denied such coverage on the basis that ABA is deemed 
investigative or experimental.102 The class argued that BCBST had 
established “a deliberate company-wide policy to deny all claims for ABA 
treatment, even though it knows the terms of its Plans provide coverage for 
the treatment” and further that such denials were made in bad faith and on 
baseless grounds.103     
The court rejected class certification on the basis that the class 
failed to meet the commonality requirement of FRCP 23(a)(2), requiring 
that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.”104 Here, the 
court reasoned, a claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA requires 
most questions be answered through individualized review of each class 
member’s claim, diagnosis, therapy and determination if ABA truly was 
experimental for their precise condition.105 Specifically, proving breach of 
fiduciary duty requires showing a connection between the fiduciaries 
actions and the harm caused to the individual.  The court focused on the 
varying degrees of autism and how each diagnosis was different.  The court 
reasoned that, “individuals suffering from . . . autism ‘may exhibit the 
characteristic traits of autism . . . in any combination, and in different 
degrees of severity,’” and therefore, “the varied behavioral disorders 
exhibited by patients with ASD, and the question of whether such behavior 
disorders may or may not be treated by ABA,” means that the class shares 
no homogeneity that would allow them to operate as a class.106   
The court specifically reserved ruling on the merits of the claim 
until the complaint could be amended by Graddy to establish an individual 
claim against BCBST’s decision to deny coverage for ABA treatment.107 
The concluding statements of the court in this opinion showed support for 
individual claims of autism coverage against insurers that had been stated 
in prior cases as well as the growing policy support found on the state and 
federal level for autism coverage, but stopped short of allowing a class 
action against an insurer.108 
It should be noted that in 2013 the District Court for Oregon 
addressed a similar class seeking only injunctive relief and, in contrast to 
                                                                                                                                
102 Id. at *4. 
103 Id. at *3, *5. 
104 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2). 
105 Graddy, 2010 WL 670081, at *9-10. 
106 Id. at *8-10. 
107 Id. at *10. 
108 Id. at *9-10. 
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Graddy, was granted certification.109 In A.F. v. Providence, the Plaintiff 
class included all current members of Providence health plans who had 
been, or will be up to the time of certification, diagnosed with autism.110 
The class sought injunctive relief against Providence to prevent them from 
uniformly applying a policy exclusion that excludes all coverage for ABA 
therapy.111 After a lengthy discussion of the requirements of a proper class 
under Rule 23(a), the judge certified the class finding that “injunction 
would provide specific and meaningful relief to all named class 
members.”112 Particularly, the judge found that resolving the question 
raised by the Plaintiffs would provide “complete relief as to the specific 
issue raised by the [class], even if it does not ultimately address every class 
members’ needs or issues.”113 While AF is the most recent iteration of the 
autism class action, the opinion issued by the court offers little beyond 
what has already been expressed in the earlier autism class action court 
rulings.  The vast majority of the AF opinion focuses on the checklist 
requirements of class certification and therefore this author believes it does 
not warrant further discussion.  
 
B.  POTTER, 2011 
 
In the second class action claim, the District Court for the Eastern 
District of Michigan certified a class claim against Blue Cross Blue Shield 
of Michigan (BCBSM) and its rejection of ABA treatment for autism.114 In 
Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, the class brought suit under 
ERISA claiming first, that BCBSM had improperly denied claims on the 
basis that ABA is deemed experimental or investigative and second, that 
BCBSM had denied them the opportunity for a full and fair review of the 
claim.115 
Michael Porter, acting as class representative, made a motion to 
certify a class containing two subclasses.  Subclass A was defined as all 
insureds under a BCBSM policy who made a claim, or will make a claim, 
                                                                                                                                
109 A.F. v. Providence Health Plan, No. 3:13-CV-00776-SI, 2013 WL 6796095 
(D. Or. Dec. 24, 2013). 
110 Id. at *4. 
111 Id. at *1. 
112 Id. at *10. 
113 Id. at *11 (emphasis in original).  
114 Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL 
9378789 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011). 
115 Id. at *2. 
620      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
  
 
for ABA therapy and the claim was, or will be, denied on grounds that such 
treatment is investigative or experimental.116 Subclass B was defined as all 
insured under a BCBSM policy who did not make a claim for ABA “in 
light of Defendant’s policy that such treatment is deemed to be 
investigative or experimental.”117 
 The court found that the numerosity standard was easily met, 
determining that, based on the business size of BCBSM and the number of 
students diagnosed with autism in Michigan schools, joinder would be 
impractical, if not impossible.118 Further, the class shared a common 
question as all of the claims depended on the same contention: there is no 
reasonable basis for stating that ABA is experimental and not a mainstream 
medical treatment.  Therefore all claims of the class would be addressed 
when the court determines if the insurer had improperly deemed ABA 
treatment experimental.119 
 It was noted that the area of most difficulty on its face was 
determining the members of the class.  While subclass A was easily 
distinguishable based on the likelihood of BCBSM maintaining records on 
claims filed, subclass B would be theoretically difficult because of the 
subjective nature of ascertaining why an individual did not file a claim.  
However, the court rejected this obstacle, stating that they can assume that 
if an individual failed to file a claim for ABA treatment, it was a result of 
them either being told, or somehow learning, that BCBSM deemed all such 
treatment experimental and excluded from coverage.  Therefore, instead of 
going through the burden of processing an insurance claim only to have it 
rejected, the individual that received ABA treatment and did not submit the 
claim did so only because of the BCBSM policy.120 
The judge here explicitly disagreed with Graddy, noting that, 
although the cases are similar, determining the case would not require 
answering individualized questions.  BCBSM made an across-the-board 
determination that ABA treatment is experimental and therefore not a 
covered benefit, thus BCBSM’s determination was not made after 
considering each individual claim and medical need, but rather based on its 
uniform determination that ABA is experimental.121   
                                                                                                                                
116 Id. at *4. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at *5. 
119 Id. at *6. 
120 Id. at *4-5. 
121 Id. at *8. 
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The class was then certified under Rule 23(b)(3) with the 
presumption that, since the class claim was that ABA claims were 
improperly rejected by BCBSM because of an experimental classification, 
no member of this class would have another reason for being rejected by 
BCBSM and therefore the class would require no individualized 
determination.122 Further, the Court rejected BCBSM’s contention and the 
Graddy Court’s reasoning, that individual determinations would be needed 
to decipher how much each class member was entitled to under their claim, 
explaining that such determinations do not predominate over the common 
issue that BCBSM improperly denied their ABA claims.123  
 
C.  CHURCHILL, 2011 
 
 The third class action, filed in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 
came to a very different conclusion than the other two courts.  In Churchill 
v. Cigna Corp., the Court differed from Graddy by choosing to certify a 
class action against an insurer for coverage of ABA treatment, but unlike 
Potter, the Court refused to include in the class members of the health 
insurance plan that had not filed claims for ABA.124 
 The Plaintiffs in Churchill charged that Cigna had improperly 
denied their claim for ABA treatment125 of autism in violation of ERISA 
and thus sought benefits and equitable relief.126 The complaint alleges that 
under Cigna’s uniform Medical Coverage Policy, Cigna excluded coverage 
of ABA on the basis that such treatment is deemed, “‘experimental, 
investigational or unproven’ for the treatment of [autism],” and therefore 
                                                                                                                                
122 Id. 
123 Id. On March 30, 2013, the district court issued judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff class. Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 10-CV-14981, 2013 
WL 4413310, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2013). The Court found that BCBS’ 
denials were arbitrary and capricious and therefore overturned the denial of 
benefits. Id. at *6. The Court remanded the claims for re-administration by BCBS, 
stating that “the remand is not an opportunity for BCBS to invent new bases for 
denial of claims that were not previously asserted.” Id. at *12-13.   
124 Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *1 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011). 
125 Id. The original complaint stated that Cigna rejected both ABA and Early 
Intensive Behavioral Intervention treatment on the grounds that both treatments 
were experimental, however, the Court reasoned that Early Intensive Behavioral 
Intervention was encapsulated by ABA and therefore both treatments will be 
referred to simply as ABA. Id. at *1 n. 2. 
126 Id. at *1. 
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excluded from coverage.127 Kristopher Churchill, acting as the class 
representative, made a motion to certify two subclasses, similar to those 
proposed in Potter, under Rule 23(b)(2) and (3).128 The first group, subclass 
A, was defined as all insureds enrolled in a plan administered or offered by 
Cigna who had made a claim, or will make a claim, for ABA therapy which 
was denied, or will be denied, on the grounds that such treatment is 
investigative or experimental.129 The complaint also moved to have 
subclass B certified as all insured who were enrolled in a plan administered 
or offered by Cigna who did not make a claim for ABA therapy in light of 
Defendant’s policy that ABA is “deemed to be investigative or 
experimental.”130 
 The Court established that certification could only be granted to an 
amended version of subclass A.131 In its reasoning, the Court found that, 
although the entire class met the numerosity requirement,132 they failed to 
meet the typicality and adequacy of representation standards of Rule 23.133 
Under its determination, the Court found that the entirety of subclass A 
shared a common question revolving around if Cigna’s denial based on a 
claim that ABA therapy is investigative and experimental was a proper 
reasoning for denial.134 Therefore, answering a single question, common to 
all members of the class, would address the individual claims.135 
 However, the Court opted to narrow Subclass A in two ways.  
                                                                                                                                
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *1-2. Rule 23 (b)(2) states that “a class action may be maintained . . . 
if . . . the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply 
generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory 
relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). Rule 
23(b)(3) states that “a class action may be maintained . . . if . . . the court finds that 
the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any 
questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to 
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
129 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *2. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at *5. 
132 The Court determined, based on the size of Cigna’s business coupled with 
the growing prevalence of autism diagnoses in America, that even if a small 
fraction of Cigna members had filed claims for ABA, subclass A would still be too 
large and too geographically diverse to “render joinder practical.” Id. at *3. 
133 Id. at *4-5. 
134  Id. at *4. 
135 Id. 
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First, because Churchill was no longer a member of a Cigna health plan he 
could not adequately represent the interests of current members as he 
lacked any discernible interest in seeking injunctive relief to prohibit Cigna 
from rejecting ABA claims.136 Therefore, the class would have to be 
limited to only individuals that were former members of Cigna’s health 
insurance plans.137 
Second, the Court rejected the reasoning that had been upheld in 
Potter, in that the class could not contain individuals who had failed to file 
a claim for ABA treatment.138 The Court found the logic of Potter 
unpersuasive, stating that individuals may have chosen to not file a claim 
for a variety of reasons, not simply because they knew of Cigna’s policy 
against ABA reimbursement, and in such cases Cigna’s policy can 
therefore not be held to cause harm.139 
In the end, the Court chose to certify a class of former Cigna 
members that had submitted claims for ABA treatments that had been 
rejected by Cigna.140 In doing so, the Court dismissed Cigna’s argument 
that it had rejected ABA claims for a variety of reasons, often noted on the 
rejection letters sent to plan members.  The Court found that, although 
Cigna listed a variety of reasons as to why it rejected the claim, including 
the argument that there might be differences in diagnoses and the type of 
ABA treatment received, Cigna had still made a class-wide determination 
that ABA was experimental in all cases and that was the basis for their 
continuous rejections.141 
 
                                                                                                                                
136 Id. at *4-5. In a subsequent filing the class was amended to capture current 
members of the health insurer by adding a second class representative who was 
currently enrolled in a Cigna health plan.  Churchill II, No. 10-6911, 2012 WL 
3590691, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
137 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4-5.   
138 Id. at *8. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at *6. On November 26, 2013 a Notice of Class Action Settlement was 
sent to class members. Notice of Class Action Settlement, Churchill v. Cigna 
Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.washingtonautismadvocacy.org/updates/wp-content/uploads/Notice-of-
ABA-Settlement-Cigna.pdf. The proposed settlement entitled class members to 
monetary damages for rejected ABA claims. Id. at 2. A fairness hearing was 
conducted on February 19, 2014. Id. at 3. At the time of publication, a final 
settlement was not yet approved by the court.  
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VI.  CONFLICTING RULINGS HIGHLIGHT THE SUBJECTIVE 
DETERMINATIONS THAT CREATE THE LEGAL TOOLS 
AVAILABLE TO CONSUMERS 
 
 While the movement to provide coverage for autism treatment has 
made great strides both in law and in the courtroom, many questions 
remain.  Can you bring a class action against an insurance company to 
require coverage for ABA treatment?  The answer depends on the district.  
Districts following Graddy require individual claims, not class actions, 
while districts following Potter and Churchill say certain class actions will 
work.  Can a certified class encapsulate all members of a plan, or only 
those who have filed a claim that was rejected?  A judge could find the 
presumption that an individual failed to file a claim because they knew of 
the insurance company’s policy applicable, while other judges may believe 
such a presumption is baseless.    
 On the face the three class actions look similar.  A group of 
individuals who could not receive health insurance coverage for autism 
treatment, all filing a claim under ERISA to answer a simple question: is a 
health insurer’s denial of ABA therapy on the grounds that it is 
“experimental” reasonable?  However, the judges in these three cases 
viewed what was before them in drastically different lights.  The 
contrasting rulings highlight the problems that arise from a class action 
against an insurance company for denial of benefits.  Such cases require a 
court to rule generally on issues that are very often individual: is this 
specific claim covered under this specific policy for this specific 
individual? 
 
A.  WHAT’S IN A DEFINITION 
 
 The first difference can be seen in the class definitions that were 
presented for certification.  Many may believe that minor differences in 
class definitions before the court can explain the conflicting rulings, but the 
differences were slight and easily malleable as demonstrated by the 
Churchill Court’s willingness to edit the class definition in its 
certification.142 
 In Graddy, the Court rejected the most basic class definition 
offered: current and former plan members who had submitted a claim for 
ABA therapy and were denied because of the company policy deeming 
                                                                                                                                
142 See Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *7. 
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ABA therapy experimental.143 Here, the Eastern District of Tennessee 
rejected the class on the basis that every class member would require an 
“individualized assessment as to the ultimate propriety of the benefits 
decision.”144 The Court reasoned that, although ABA treatment is beneficial 
to individuals diagnosed with autism, it is not always the preferred and 
appropriate therapy, nor is the amount required set in stone.  Rather, each 
individual diagnosis requires individual review to determine what therapy 
is needed, how much, and to what level it should be covered by the health 
insurance plan.145  
 On the other hand, the Potter Court found no such individualized 
assessment is required and went so far as to broaden the class definition.  
The Court certified a class that contained current and past members of the 
health plan who received ABA treatment regardless of whether they had or 
had not submitted a claim to the insurer.146 The Court directly disagreed 
with Graddy, determining that a company-wide policy deeming ABA 
therapy experimental had been applied across the board without individual 
assessment of claims, and therefore individual review of the claims, or not 
claims, was not necessary.  The company policy on its own was at it issue, 
and therefore the issue is capable of remedy without individual assessment. 
 Finally, Churchill was originally presented with the same broad 
class definition that occurred in Potter, a class that consisted of current and 
former members who had received ABA treatment regardless of if they had 
filed a claim.147 Rather than rejecting the class entirely or accepting the 
class definition, the Churchill Court opted to apply judicial discretion and 
narrow the class definition.  In doing so, limited the class to only those 
individuals who had made claims to their insurer, finding that such a 
definition was apt for class certification.148 The Churchill Court rejected the 
reasoning of the Graddy Court.149 Such discretion emphasizes the 
uncertainty regarding class actions against insurers and the ability to use 
general determinations against a business that relies on individual 
appraisals. 
                                                                                                                                
143 Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL 
670081, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).  
144 Id. at *9. 
145 Id. at *10. 
146 Potter v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., No. 10-cv-14981, 2011 WL 
9378789, at *1, *4 (E.D. Mich. July 14, 2011).  
147 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *2. 
148 Id. at *8. 
149 Id. at *8, n. 13.  
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B.  HOW MUCH, IF ANY, RELIEF IS APPROPRIATE 
 
The second significant difference between the cases rested with 
what type of class-wide relief that would be appropriate.  In Graddy, the 
Court found that the class could not seek injunctive relief under Rule 
23(b)(2) because the class’ claim rested on a breach of the fiduciary duty 
imposed under ERISA which could only be proven by a clear link between 
the breach of duty and the harm experienced.  For the Court, such a link 
was dependent on the equities of each individual claim, which would in 
turn require an individual evaluation of each class member, their diagnosis, 
treatment plan, and specific claim.  With a lack of homogeneity within the 
class, final injunctive relief would not be appropriate for the class as a 
whole.150 
However, the Potter Court found such reasoning inapplicable, and 
determined that not only could the class of current and former members be 
extended to include individuals who had not even filed a claim, but also 
that they could seek both injunctive and monetary relief.151 For the Eastern 
District of Michigan, a class of individuals denied coverage of a specific 
treatment, as the result of a company-wide policy are entitled first, to 
injunctive relief152 to prevent the company from applying such a policy and 
second, to monetary relief153 that would provide reimbursement for their 
out-of-pocket expenses.154 The Court held that although individuals would 
be entitled to varying amounts depending on their claim, individual 
entitlement amounts did not predominate over the fact that all members of 
the health plan had been denied benefits solely on the company policy that 
deemed ABA therapy “experimental”.155 
Finally, in Churchill, the Court walked the line between the 
opposing opinions of the earlier courts when it ruled that a class of 
individuals who had made a claim for ABA that was denied could not seek 
injunctive relief, but could receive monetary relief.  The Court found that 
the question of what was owed to the consumers turned on the status of the 
individuals in the class.  Since one subclass contained former members of 
the Cigna health plans, injunctive relief was inappropriate because former 
                                                                                                                                
150 Graddy, 2010 WL 670081 at *8. 
151 Potter, 2011 WL 9378789 at *9-10. 
152 Id. at *9. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at *1. 
155 Id. at *9. 
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members would not be seeking a ruling requiring Cigna to change its 
company policy for they would receive no benefit from such a change in 
policy.156 However, the other class of current members who had filed 
claims could seek monetary damages rather than injunctive relief. 
 While all three classes commonly sought at least partial relief 
under Rule 23(b)(2), the rulings provided three contradictory holdings on 
whether such relief is applicable.  The competing approaches and reasoning 
leave individuals and lawyers without any clear answers.  Is a challenge of 
an insurance company for an unreasonable denial of benefits available as a 
class action, and if it is, what relief can be offered? 
 
VII.  HOW TO APPROACH AUTISM CLASS ACTIONS IN LIGHT 
OF AN UNCLEAR PATH FROM THE COURTS 
 
Autism coverage class actions paint a blurry picture at best.  The 
complicated web of federal and state laws striving to provide autism 
coverage is often sidestepped by ERISA’s distinction between insured and 
self-insured, leaving plans free to reject claims for treatment.  Individual 
challenges to these tactics, while often successful, have proven inefficient.  
In order to truly clarify answers, the insured have pursued claims 
collectively, but even collective action has resulted in three different 
judicial approaches.  First, courts have determined that individual questions 
matter in resolving the reasonableness of an insurer’s decision and 
therefore must be reviewed independently.157 Others have found that when 
a company applies an across-the-board determination regarding a benefit, a 
remedy may also be provided across-the-board.158 Still other courts have 
stated that although you may overcome the individualized nature of 
diagnosis and treatment plans, you cannot bind people who never acted, 
even if they were harmed by the actions of an insurance company.159 
  Even though the picture is complicated and the precedent 
confusing, moving forward courts can apply a standard that allows for 
individuals to collectively challenge insurance companies and fill the gap 
left by federal and state legislation of autism coverage.  Taking into 
                                                                                                                                
156 Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *6-7 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011). 
157 Graddy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Tenn., No. 4:09-cv-84, 2010 WL 
670081, at *9-10 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 19, 2010).  
158 Potter, 2011 WL 9378789, at *6, *8. 
159 Churchill, 2011 WL 3563489, at *7-8. 
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consideration the requirements and policy basis of Rule 23(a) and (b)(2),160 
allowing class actions against insurers best serves the interest of an 
efficient judicial system and with proper limitations can strike the balance 
of providing global peace to all parties while still allowing for individual 
assessments that insurance companies rely on in business.   
 Determining if an insurance company’s decision to rule ABA 
therapy as experimental is reasonable does not require an individualized 
assessment of every claim.  Rather, the company-wide policy is in 
question, not the individual denials; therefore if a court were to determine 
reasonableness they would determine an answer to a common question to 
all class members.  As the advisory committee notes state, “necessity for a 
class action is greatest when the courts are called upon to order . . . the 
alteration of the status quo in circumstances such that a large number of 
persons are in a position to call on a single person to alter the status quo . . . 
.”161 Applicable here, the courts are being asked to evaluate the company 
policies regarding ABA therapy, rather than each individual rejection of 
such a claim.  Courts should not be looking at whether every denied claim 
was appropriate, nor should they conclude that anyone with an autism 
diagnosis is entitled to ABA therapy.  Rather, appropriate analysis of the 
court should focus on the company policy that hinders millions of 
Americans’ access to benefits they need.  If autism coverage class action 
                                                                                                                                
160 Pertinent subsections are as follows: 
 
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only 
if: 
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is 
impracticable; 
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and 
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be maintained 
if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if . . . 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act 
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final 
injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is 
appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . . 
 
FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
161 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note. 
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claims are accepted by the court as a challenge to insurers’ company-wide 
policies rather than individual claims for benefits, a court can sustain a 
class certification pursuant to the goals of Rule 23 outlined in the advisory 
committee notes.    
 However, while such questions can be answered for the class, two 
distinct limitations discussed in Graddy and Churchill must be established 
to ensure uniformity in application and adherence to the requirements and 
goals of class actions.  First, as the class action jurisprudence stands now, 
class actions challenging an insurer’s policy towards coverage of autism 
treatment should be limited to injunctive relief.  As Rule 23(b)(2) states, 
“[when] the party opposing the class has acted . . . on grounds that apply 
generally to the class . . . final injunctive relief . . . is appropriate [for] the 
class as a whole.”162 Specifically, this has been interpreted to establish two 
requirements.  First, that the party opposing the class, here the insurers 
have acted, or refused to act, on grounds generally applicable to the class as 
a whole, and second, any final injunctive relief settling the legality of the 
behavior is appropriate to the class as a whole.163 Applying such 
interpretation here, an insurance company who makes and enforces a 
company-wide policy, irrespective of each individual, that deems certain 
well-accepted procedures as experimental and thus never coverable, has 
acted on grounds applicable to all plan members who sought or are seeking 
such treatment and in turn, determination of a court regarding the legality 
of such a policy applies generally to the class.  
As the Supreme Court has stated, “[t]he key to the (b)(2) class is 
the ‘indivisible nature of the injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted —
the notion that the conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared 
unlawful only as to all of the class members or as to none of them.’”164 
Under this principle, if the policy is deemed unreasonable, injunctive relief 
that prevents them from applying such policy applies generally for the 
entire class of effected individuals.  A Rule 23(b)(2) class grants members 
of an insurance plan the opportunity to collectively challenge insurers on 
the limited question of if a policy is reasonable.  This allows individuals to 
create a stronger driving force based in unity, while still preserving the 
right of insurers to make individual assessments.  Preventing an across-the-
board policy opposing a treatment does not strip from insurers the right to 
review claims for treatment and determine if it fits within the plan language 
                                                                                                                                
162 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). 
163 2 ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 
4:11 (4th ed. 2002).  
164 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557 (2011). 
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and is appropriate.  Rather, review of a company-wide policy and its 
application prevents an insurer from establishing a policy that unfairly 
hurts and impedes the rights of consumers without consideration for the 
actual claim, plan language, or any other information relied on by insurers 
typically when reviewing a benefit claim. 
 While our current jurisprudence lays a clear and straightforward 
path towards injunctive relief, an area worthy of further exploration is the 
potential for success as a (b)(3) class seeking reimbursement.  Although 
some lower courts have begun to explore reasoning that would support a 
(b)(3) class against insurers for claim denials, the success is limited and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence signals a pushback.  Courts that have 
supported (b)(3) classes against insurers first find predominance in the 
form of the overriding legal issue of the class, rather than focusing on the 
individualized damages that would arise.  For example, in Bauer v. Kraft 
Foods Global, Inc., a local union and retired employees sued an employer 
under ERISA and their collective bargaining agreement because of the 
elimination of a health plan and increased cost of prescription drugs.165  
The district court reasoned that the “overriding legal issue” presented was 
whether the employer’s plan amendments violated the class members rights 
generally.166 Since that question predominated and the only subsequent 
issue would be damages, certification under (b)(3) was applicable.167  
Applied to autism class actions, the overriding legal issue, whether the 
insurer’s denial of coverage for autism treatment is reasonable, would 
predominate over any other issue presented. 
 Although such an argument could be made, in order to certify an 
autism class action as a (b)(3) class, courts must be willing to view 
individualized damages as secondary to the overriding legal issue, thus 
maintaining predominance.  As such, in order for a (b)(3) class to prevail a 
court must accept the argument that while the amount of individual 
damages may vary, the formula used to calculate them is consistent across 
the board.  The Fourth Circuit accepted a similar proposition in Ward v. 
Dixie National Life Insurance Co., a class action against insurers claiming 
that supplemental cancer insurance policies require payment to the insured 
at the rate of the actual charged treatment, rather than the lesser amount 
medical providers received from insurers.168 This reasoning is easily 
transferable to autism class actions in that the requested monetary damages 
                                                                                                                                
165 Bauer v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 277 F.R.D. 558, 558 (W.D. Wis. 2012). 
166 Id. at 563. 
167 Id. at 563-564. 
168 Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d 164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010). 
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of the class are simply the cost of treatment not covered by the insurer, a 
simple and standard equation for all members of the class. 
 Despite the fact that the argument may be made in favor of a (b)(3) 
class action against insurers, a recent decision of the Supreme Court in 
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend raises concerns about the acceptance of such a 
“one formula for all” argument.169 While the Plaintiffs in Comcast 
developed a formula for damages that incorporated four theories of 
antitrust impact, it failed to distinguish which specific theory applied.170  
Thus, one segment of the class could have damages based on the theory 
that Comcast overcharged because of the elimination of provider 
competition, while another segment is entitled to damages because of 
Comcast’s increased bargaining power.171 Justice Scalia made clear that, 
while a uniform damages equation may exist, one must first ensure that 
there is a “translation of the legal theory of the harmful event into an 
analysis of the economic impact of that event.”172 Under this principle, 
concerns about a universal formula for an autism class action may be 
raised.  Although an insurer has a company-wide policy of denial for ABA 
therapy, perhaps even absent such a policy, a claim may still be denied.  
For instance, an insured might receive ABA therapy from a non-covered 
provider, thus subject to a different reimbursement rate, or conceivably, 
although the child is on the autism spectrum, ABA therapy is not the 
recommended treatment and thus not covered.  Directly contrasted to the 
holding in Comcast, while uniform damages may apply, the harmful event 
of a company-wide policy does not directly translate to the economic 
impact; other factors may also contribute.  Under the Comcast precedent 
and the shaky ground on which a (b)(3) class for denied insurance claims 
rests, this author would hesitate without a clearer showing by the courts to 
pursue such a class. 
Further, there is concern and caution for a class action seeking 
monetary damages for a denial of benefits inherent in the insurance world.  
Insurance companies, as part of their business model for assuming risk, 
maintain the ability to review claims individually and determine in each 
case what is allowed.  If a class action were allowed to seek monetary 
damages, the individual question of how much each plan member was 
entitled to would be answered universally, removing from the insurer the 
business right to review the claim.  Normally, for an insurer, monetary 
                                                                                                                                
169  Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). 
170 Id. at 1430-31. 
171 Id. at 1433-34. 
172 Id. at 1435. 
632      CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL  Vol. 20.2 
  
 
relief would involve a close examination by the insurer of the claim, the 
policy, the diagnosis, and the treatment plan.  A class action would remove 
such independent review applied by insurers in all other claims.  Therefore, 
in allowing the insured to challenge insurance companies as a class action, 
they should be limited in injunctive or declaratory relief, which addresses 
these concerns and controls the reach of the class action. 
 Second, in allowing a class action for injunctive relief, the court 
must limit the class definition to capture only individuals who are currently 
part of the plan regardless of if they have filed a claim or not.  As discussed 
above, class actions for autism treatment should be limited to seeking 
injunctive relief, which sets the foundation for limiting class members to 
those currently enrolled in the plan.  The claims at issue in these class 
actions are similar to issues arising in employment class actions when a 
class includes present and former employees.  Under such circumstances, 
courts have reasoned that only current, and not former, employees would 
be affected, meaning the class would no longer fall within the perimeters of 
Rule 23(b)(2).173 Past members of an insurance plan cannot share the same 
interest as current members in seeking injunctive relief, for past members 
would receive no benefit from a ruling that prevents insurers from issuing 
uniform rejections of ABA therapy.174 Therefore, if only injunctive relief 
class actions are to be certified in regards to autism treatment claims, class 
members must be limited to those that would receive actual relief via an 
injunction, not open to all those who have been wronged in the past. 
 Finally, contrary to the rationale applied by Churchill to reject a 
broad class encompassing those who submitted claims and those who did 
not, the restriction to only injunctive relief claims requires no such 
separation.  As a result of being restricted to 23(b)(2) classes, any class 
action brought before a court would be considered a mandatory class and 
therefore, regardless of a claim’s status, all members of the plan and the 
                                                                                                                                
173 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:32 (5th ed. 
2011); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2559-60 (2011); Chen-
Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877 F. Supp. 2d 113, 121 (S.D.N.Y 2012) 
(interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes to reason that former 
employees “have no material stake in whether their former employer is or is not 
enjoined . . .. since they are no longer there.”). 
174 See Churchill v. Cigna Corp., No. 10-6911, 2011 WL 3563489, at *4 (E.D. 
Penn. Aug. 12, 2011), where the Court notes why it cannot certify a class 
encompassing current and past plan members that is represented solely by a past 
plan participant.  The former plan participant has an “incentive . . . to seek only the 
highest amount of monetary relief possible, not injunctive relief from which he 
could not benefit.” Id. at *5.  
2014  MINDING THE GAP 633 
  
 
class would receive the same relief.  A ruling that prevents an insurer from 
applying a company-wide policy prohibiting coverage of ABA therapy 
because of experimental status would have the same benefit for all insured.  
Whether they filed a claim or not, the insurer would no longer be allowed 
to enforce the policy that prevented coverage and all individuals would be 
free to submit claims as they see fit.  
Churchill’s final paragraphs sufficiently outline why a broad class 
approach is unpersuasive, stating a presumption that all insured failed to 
submit a claim based on the insurance providers company policy to deny 
ABA coverage is impractical.175 As the Churchill Court found, there are a 
“multitude of reasons why a beneficiary might fail to file a claim,” and 
depending on the situation, the insurer’s policy designating ABA therapy 
experimental would not be the actual cause of harm to the individual.176 By 
limiting remedies in these class actions a court removes the need to 
determine the motivations of each class member.  While there still remains 
a “multitude of reasons why a beneficiary might fail to file a claim,” such 
considerations no longer warrant examination by the courts to determine 
appropriate remedies.177  
Although judicial precedent has done little to pave a clear path for 
autism treatment class actions against insurers, future class certification and 
class action claims can be better analyzed.  Consideration can be given to 
the three recent holdings of Graddy, Potter, and Churchill, but the 
approach that will best serve individuals and insurers finds its base in no 
single case.  Individuals should be empowered to unify in challenges 
against their insurers when denied autism treatment coverage but within 
limits that respect and preserve insurers’ autonomy to maintain 
individualized review. 
 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
 
With state laws unable to reach self-insured plans and federal laws 
failing to address the gap of required coverage that results from ERISA 
preemption provisions, it is unlikely we will see a decrease in courtroom 
battles for treatment coverage.  While individual claims will undoubtedly 
continue, the recent showing of three class actions focused on the same 
                                                                                                                                
175 Id. at *7-8. 
176 Id. at *8. 
177 Id. The Court also states that the Third Circuit precedent requiring ERISA 
plaintiffs to file a claim for benefits before a request for judicial interference would 
prohibit them from following such a presumption. Id.  
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question, presents the court system with a new challenge: establishing an 
understanding of the extent to which class actions can be brought to 
challenge insurers’ practices.  With a complicated web of state laws, 
federal regulations, and unclear judicial precedent, the court system must 
seriously examine its approach to complicated class action lawsuits.  In 
doing so, one must look no further than the most recent class certification 
rulings, which, although contradictory, can serve as a patchwork for future 
court decisions.  
 
